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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
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9 August 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Meeting, 10 August 1983

1. The subject meeting is scheduled for 10 August 1983 at 1500 hours in the White House Situation Room (Tab 1). The subjects for discussions are:

- Approval of the revised approach whereby two separate reports will be proposed for the President on Space Station and National Space Strategy; and
- Agencies' views on the draft Space Station Report and the preferred option for the President's consideration.

The DDCI is the Intelligence Community representative to the SIG(Space) and is planning to attend.

2. Background:

- SIG(Space) activities relative to Space Station and National Space Strategy have been under way for about one year (Attachment 1).
- In June 1983, Judge Clark directed that the response to NSSD 5-83, Manned Space Station, be consolidated with other inputs for NSSD 13-82, National Space Strategy, for presentation to the President. A draft NSSD 13-82 report was issued on 13 July 1983. Agency comments were generally negative, leading to an IG(Space) meeting to discuss revised approaches.

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- The IG(Space) met on 28 July 1983 and concluded that it would be best to proceed to the President with two reports; one on the Space Station in September and one on National Space Strategy later this fall when the information from other ongoing activities (e.g., Strategic Defense Study, Commercialization Initiatives) would be available.

3. Discussion: The subject report (Tab 2) and the response to NSSD 5-83 (Tab 3) are the formal documents that will support the Presidential decision. Intelligence Community views on the subjects for discussion were requested; responses, which are well worth reading, are in Attachment 2 and summarized below. There are three items for consideration:

Item 1: Whether or not to approve the revised approach whereby two separate reports will be proposed for the President on Space Station and National Space Strategy.

Option 1: Approve the revised approach.

Option 2: Defer the Manned Space Station decision and consider this decision as part of the National Space Strategy.

Discussion:

- Option 1 has already been endorsed by the IG(Space). NASA and the NSC Staff are committed to an early decision on this issue.
- NASA and the NSC Staff would argue that this decision is independent of the National Space Strategy decision. We feel that the MSS decision is really a major part of the Space Strategy and attempting to decide it in isolation might lead to a wrong decision. As part of the Space Strategy decision, the President may wish to decide whether his emphasis should be on national security space activities or on civil space activities because it is not clear there are sufficient resources to pursue both goals simultaneously. Similarly, the Space Station decision should be made in the context of the entire NASA program. It is likely that the NASA budget would have to increase significantly to pursue the Manned Space Station program and also maintain a balanced civil space program.

Agency Positions: Most agencies are likely to support the IG(Space) decision.

Intelligence Community Positions: None.

Recommendation: Indicate preference for Option 2.

Item 2: Agency views on Space Station Report.

Discussion:

- The report was prepared on an accelerated basis and would be marginally improved by continued refinement and editing.

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- Most of the key arguments pro and con are included. Supporting data and analysis are lacking.
- The relationship of the report to national space strategy is not included. A short reference to this relationship should be added to the preface.
- There are numerous intermediate options and combinations of options that could be added. This might best be done after the SIG(Space) discussions as there might be consensus that some kind of compromise position is needed.

Agency Positions: OMB may take the position that the report contains insufficient analysis.

Intelligence Community Positions: Report considered marginally acceptable.

Recommendation: Endorse the report as being adequate, pending SIG(Space) discussions of the options. Insist, however, that the Drafting Group reconvene to take into account, within the existing report structure, major substantive comments received from the SIG(Space) members.

Item 3: Preferred Space Station option for the President's consideration.

Option 1: Commit now to a permanently manned civil Space Station.

Option 2: Commit now to evolutionary development of expanded STS capabilities and unmanned platforms.

Option 3: Defer commitment to either Option 1 or Option 2 pending additional definition of requirements, costs, and risks.

These options are fully described in the Space Station Report and summarized in Attachment 3.


Alternatives:

- Support Option 1.
- Support Option 2.
- Support Option 3.
- Abstain.
- Support a new compromise option.

Discussion:

- All members of the Intelligence Community vigorously oppose Option 1.

- There are no current Intelligence Community requirements for a Manned Space Station.



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- We are concerned with the high cost of this option and related costs that have not yet been defined.
- Presidential approval of this initiative (while simultaneously cutting national security space budgets) might send the wrong signal to Congress.
- We are concerned about the impact on the Shuttle program.
- The Manned Space Station decision should be made within the context of other major civil and national security space decisions.
- Most of the Intelligence Community principals support Option 3. Some would accept Option 2 as a fallback position.
 - Option 2 has some features that would be of use to the Intelligence Community and its cost is moderate.
- An abstention could be justified on the basis of our lack of firm requirements and our unwillingness to pay for the Manned Space Station.



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- A new compromise option could incorporate features of 1, 2 and 3. It might commit the President to an eventual Manned Space Station but modify the funding profile significantly and defer an architectural decision (hardware go-ahead) until about 1988 (See Attachment 4). It could also allow for development of Option 2 capabilities. Another agency might propose this option at the SIG(Space) meeting. Most Intelligence Community agencies oppose this compromise because of their concern that NASA might divert funds from the Shuttle to pursue the Space Station.

Recommendation: Support Option 3. However, if a go-ahead appears inevitable, advocate a more slowly paced and lower cost compromise.



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
Agency Views:

- Option 1 - NASA.
- Option 2 - None.
- Option 3 - Defense, OMB.

Intelligence Community Views:

- Option 2 - Fallback position only (NSA, NRO).
- Option 3 - Unanimously supported.

4. Talking Points: Proposed Talking Points are provided in Attachment 5.



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Attachments (5)

1. Background Information
2. Intelligence Community Views
3. MSS Options
4. Compromise Option
5. Proposed Talking Points

Tabs (9)

Tab List Provided

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Attachment 1

Background

The following Space Station activities were initiated:

- NASA set up a Manned Space Station task force supported by eight (\$500K each) industry contracts.
- SIG(Space) established an Interagency Working Group. The Terms of Reference developed by the Working Group was later issued as NSSD 5-83 (Tab 4).
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- The Working Group report (response to NSSD 5-83) was sent to IG(Space) members on 2 July 1983 (Tab 3). The Report has been distributed to senior representatives of the Intelligence Community and the following comments have been received (Tab 6):
 - CIA: Concurs in findings of the report with regard to lack of intelligence requirements. Believes launch of Soviet permanently manned Space Station will not change world perceptions of US space leadership.
 - State: Concurs in the views of the Intelligence Community as reflected in the report. Challenges NASA report that Soviet Salyut program is adversely affecting perception of US space leadership.
 - NSA: Concurs in Intelligence Community positions in report. While encouraging additional studies to lead to greater use of man in space, questions ability of the nation to support a major manned Space Station program without impacting unfavorably on projected national security space program.
 - DoD: No formal replies received to date. Staff levels have endorsed study report.
 - NRO: Agrees with its general thrust and conclusions. Continues to have several major reservations.

NSSD 13-82, National Space Strategy, was issued on 15 December 1982 (Tab 7).

- After extensive interagency discussion, a revised approach was endorsed by the SIG(Space) on 25 March 1983 (Tab 8).

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- Three Agency Strategy Reports were submitted to the NSC on 31 May 1983.
- An Interagency Drafting Group was convened to consolidate the inputs (including NIE 11-1 and the response to NSSD 5-83, Manned Space Station) for presentation to the President. A draft NSSD 13-82 report was issued on 13 July 1983. Agency comments were generally negative, leading to an IG(Space) meeting to discuss revised approaches.
- The IG(Space) met on 28 July 1983 and concluded that it would be best to proceed to the President with two reports; one on the Space Station in September and one on National Space Strategy later this fall when the information from other ongoing activities (e.g., Strategic Defense Study, Commercialization Initiatives) would be available.

The SIG(Space) meeting is scheduled at this time (10 August), in part because Judge Clark and the President will be on the West Coast from approximately 15 August through 5 September.

- Written agency positions are requested by 19 August.
- An NSC meeting on this issue is planned for approximately 15 September.
- The NASA Administrator, Mr. Jim Beggs, announced to the press in late July that a favorable Presidential decision on the Manned Space Station issue was expected by early September. (We understand the White House later advised Mr. Beggs to be careful about preempting the Presidential decision.)

Other related SIG(Space) activities were:

- NIE 11-1 was briefed to the President on 20 July 1983. The Soviet military threat in space (according to DIA) and a companion discussion of US national security space programs were briefed to the President on 9 August 1983.
- On 3 August 1983, there was a White House meeting on space commercialization activities. Executives of major corporations met with White House advisors and the President. Most of this industry advisory group took a position favoring a Manned Space Station and we understand that the President said that he was inclined to agree with them. The White House space commercialization review will continue.

John Hodge of NASA presented the MSS briefing to the DIRNSA on 4 August 1983. The discussion before, during, and subsequent to the briefing is of interest (Tab 9).

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Attachment 2

Intelligence Community Views

DNRO: Following.

EXDIR/CIA: Following.

DIRNSA: Following.

ACSI/AF: Following.

DNI: Following.

DUSD(P): Supports Option 3.

ACSI/Army: Defers to DUSD(P).

DUSD/C³I: Not received.

D/State/INR: Following.

D/DIA: Supports Option 3 (by telephone to D/ICS).

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